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 1 
The NLRA vs. The First Amendment: Which One Helps the Employee Who Loves Social 
Media? 
 
Megan Kosovich 
 
 
Introduction 
  “I’m not a teacher --- I’m a warden for future criminals!  They had a scared straight 
program in school --- why couldn’t i [sic] bring 1st graders?1”  In March 2011 Jennifer O’Brien, a 
first grade school teacher in Patterson, New Jersey, posted this comment on her Facebook page 
commenting on her class and a program the school held for other students.  While the audience 
of O’Brien’s comment may have only been intended for a few “friends,” the actual audience was 
anything but.
2
  National news networks reported on the comment while parents and community 
organizers protested the behavior of the teacher.
3
  Soon after the comment was made, O’Brien 
was suspended without pay, and administrative law proceedings commenced thereafter to 
determine whether probable cause existed to warrant her dismissal from her tenured position.
4
  
 Viki Knox, a teacher in Union, New Jersey, faced a similar fate as O’Brien when she 
posted a comment expressing her opinion concerning a display the high school devoted to the 
                                                 
1
 Matter of Tenure Hearing (O’Brien), OAL DKT EDU 05600-1, 2011 WL 5429055, at *1 (N.J. 
Admin Oct. 28 2011).   
2
 See Id. at *2; Joe Green, Judge Rules Paterson, N.J. Teacher Jennifer O’Brien Can be Fired for 
Facebook Comments, NEWSROOM JERSEY (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/judge-rules-paterson-nj-teacher-jennifer-obrien-can-
be-fired-for-facebook-comments. 
3
 Id. at *3. 
4
 Id. at *1. 
 2 
Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender History Month.
5
  Similar incidents of employees posting 
comments that spark a firestorm of debate among the public community have also been reported 
across the country, and while some employers have responded with appropriate social media 
policies, this new area of law ignites debate over the constitutional and labor rights of employees 
in general.
6
 
 This paper attempts to address this new area of social media output and federal 
employment law.  Should employees be subject to discipline for what they say on Facebook?  
What are the potential free speech implications for taking action against what employees say 
after hours, and for what is only intended to be said among a few “friends?” This paper will then 
address what other potential labor issues a private employer can face if they fire an employee for 
what he or she says on a social media site. Finally, this paper will compare and contrast private 
employees’ rights with public employees’ rights to determine which employees’ speech is 
protected more. 
 To answer these questions this paper will first review the free speech laws in the 
employment context.  It will then address the private and public employment distinction in the 
law, and how the distinction affects employees in their social media interactions. Finally, this 
paper will examine how private employees have tackled social media problems, and compare 
                                                 
5
 Bob Considline and Jessica Calefati, School Board Files Tenure Charges Against N.J. Teacher 
Who Made Anti-Gay Comments on Facebook, N.J.COM (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/01/school_board_files_tenure_char.html (Knox posted, 
“Why parade your unnatural immoral behaviors before the rest of us?... I DO NOT HAVE TO 
TOLERATE ANYTHING OTHERS WISH TO DO. I DO HAVE TO LOVE AND SPEAK 
AND DO WHAT’S RIGHT!”).  
6
 NJEA Members: Tips for Twitter and Facebook, NJEA, 
http://www.njea.org/resources/~/link.aspx?_id=C7C0D97FC1D74C6D9B918E6BA12A87BF&_
z=z 
 
 3 
which approach, the private approach or the public approach, better protects employees’ speech 
on Facebook.  
A. General Free Speech Overview  
1. Public Employment 
 While the First Amendment explicitly states that “Congress shall make no law… 
abridging the freedom of speech,” the protections of the First Amendment are in no way absolute, 
especially in the context of employment.
7
  Generally speaking, “employees have the right to 
speak on matters of public concern.”8  To determine when an employee’s right can be enforced 
against adverse employment actions, the Supreme Court conducts a balancing test taking into 
account both the State’s interest as an employer and the employee’s First Amendment 
protections.
9
  
“[T]he State has interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees 
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”10  
 
This Pickering balancing approach has been refined and applied by the Supreme Court in a two 
pronged analysis articulated in Connick v. Myers.
11
 First, the Court analyses whether the speech 
                                                 
7
 U.S. CONST. amend I; see City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (holding that the 
State employer can “impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints that 
would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public[;]” see Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. 
High School Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968); see also, Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1993).  
8
 City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004). 
9
 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568;  
10
 Id.  
11
 Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).  
 4 
at issue can be “fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.”12 If 
the speech at issue is not characterized as such, then the Court does not need to examine the 
adverse employment action taken by the employer under free speech grounds.
13
 The Court 
reasoned that this characterization test is necessary in order to prevent a flood of constitutional 
challenges taken anytime that a state employee was disciplined for what he or she said. 
14
 
If the speech at issue does touch “upon a matter of public concern,” and the speech 
contributed to an adverse employment action, the Court must then “reach the most appropriate 
possible balance of the competing interests,” those being that of the employee’s free speech 
interest with the “government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its 
responsibilities to the public.”15  
 While not addressing social media output, the Supreme Court stated that the second step 
in the public employee free speech balancing test is only applied “when the employee speaks as a 
citizen upon matters of public concern rather than as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest.”16 Determining whether speech is a “matter of public concern” in the social media age 
can potentially prove problematic.
17
   Courts must determine whether an employee who uses 
                                                 
12
 Id.  
13
 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government official should 
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the 
name of the First Amendment.”  
14
 Id. at 149. (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of 
public concern would mean that virtually every remark- and certainly ever criticism directed at a 
public official- would plant the seed of a constitutional case…the First Amendment does not 
require a pulic office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office 
affairs.”) 
15
 Id. at 150-51.  
16
 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83 (2004).  
17
 See Matter of Tenure Hearing (O’Brien), OAL DKT EDU 05600-1, 2011 WL 5429055, at *2 
(Determining that O’Brien “took a legitimate issue of public concern ‘and distorted [it] into a 
vehicle’ to let her more than 300 Facebook ‘friends’ know she was having a bad time at work.”)  
 5 
social media is truly expressing a matter of public concern when they do so, or rather, if they are 
“distorting” matters of concern into a “vehicle” to complain about work.18 Courts arguably have 
the most difficult time determining whether this aspect of the Connick analysis has been met.
19
 
 In City of San Diego the Supreme Court had to address whether a police officer’s sexual 
videos sold online were “matters of public concern” and if so, whether he could be fired from his 
state employment.
20
  The police officer in City of San Diego was fired because he sold videos of 
himself stripping in a police uniform, and he also had an online forum where he sold official 
police uniforms, and other official police equipment of the San Diego Police Department.
21
  The 
Court outlined the reasons for protecting State employees’ First Amendment rights, stating, 
“public employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed 
opinions as to the operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial 
concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these matters, the community would be 
deprived of informed opinions on important public issue.”22 The Court focused on the interest of 
the public in allowing public employees to speak on important issues, reasoning that “[t]he 
interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the 
employee’s own right to disseminate it.”23   
Determining what speech qualifies for protection, the Court examined “the ‘content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as reveled by the whole record.’”24 Examples of speech that the 
                                                 
18
 Id.  
19
 See Elizabeth J. Bohn, Put on Your Coat, A Chill Wind Blows: Embracing the Expansion of 
the Adverse Employment Action Factor in Tenth Circuit First Amendment Retaliation Claims. 83 
DENV. U. L. REV. 867, 869 (2006). 
20
 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 78.  
21
 Id. at 78. 
22
 Id. at 83. 
23
 Id.   
24
 Id. at 83 (citing Connick, 461 U.S., at 146-47.)  
 6 
Court gave that are “matters of public concern” included comments about the President of the 
United States, and statements that are the “subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of 
general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.”25 In City of 
San Diego, the Court found that sexual videos being sold online were not matters of public 
interest and no balancing of the interests was necessary.
26
  
While the actual speech at issue in City of San Diego was not a Facebook post, it was a 
form of Internet communication engaged in during off-work hours.
27
 So while employees may 
not be on the clock when they are posting status updates on Facebook, they can still be held 
accountable by their employers for what they say online, if what they say does not fall into a 
“matter of public concern.”  However, even if what a public employee says online can qualify as 
a “matter of public concern,” the government employer’s interest may be so great, that it can 
overcome the constitutional interests of the employee.
28
  
In the school context, courts are hesitant to protect the free speech of a teacher when the 
comments made by the teacher have interfered with the purpose of a school.
29
  The O’Brien 
court rejected the argument that the speech at issue was a matter of public concern, however, the 
court held that even if the speech was a matter of public concern, the State’s interest would still 
prevail because of the setting the employee worked in. What can be derived from this particular 
case is that the public employee may have more or less restraints on his or her free speech 
protections depending on the type of position they serve for the state.  
                                                 
25
 Id. at 83-84 
26
 Id. at 84. 
27
 Id. at 78.  
28
See Matter of Tenure Hearing (O’Brien), OAL DKT EDU 05600-1, 2011 WL 5429055, at *2-
3 (While the Court ultimately held that the employees comments were not matters of public 
concern, they still engaged in a Pickering analysis, holding that the employers interest 
outweighed the interests of the employee.)  
29
 See generally, id.  
 7 
For schools, the O’Brien court stated that “restraints on speech have particular 
applicability in a school setting, where a teacher, like O’Brien, is responsible for nurturing young 
children, and must work in concert with administrators, parents and the community at large to 
promote student success.”30 The importance of the school setting in the determination of free 
speech infringements is also seen by the deference courts give to the findings of the arbitrators.
31
 
In some states, like New York, great deference is given to the findings of arbitrators in 
determining whether free speech rights have been violated.  There, courts will not even examine 
the free speech arguments if the hearing officers determine that the comments were not a matter 
of public concern.
32
  
In different contexts however, courts may not give the same deference as they would for 
a school.
33
 In Mattingly, the Eastern District of Arkansas held that an employee’s complaints34 
about the firing of other co-workers in the Circuit Clerk’s office were matters of public concern.  
Even though multiple phone calls were made by the public to the Circuit Clerk’s office 
criticizing the Clerk for firing employees, the court found that the posts did not “‘adversely 
affect[] the efficiency of the Circuit Clerks office.’”35  No special weight was given to the Circuit 
Clerk’s office in the Mattingly opinion so as to allow for the employer to justify the firing in 
relation to a Facebook post.  
While not about social media output, in Rankin v. McPherson, the Supreme Court held 
that when “an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contract role, the danger 
                                                 
30
 Id.  
31
 See Rubino v. City of New York, No. 107292/11, 2012 WL 373101, at *5 (N.Y. Gen. Term Feb. 
1, 2012). 
32
 See Id.  
33
 See Mattingly v. Milligan, 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).  
34
 Id. at *2. (Employee posted after co-workers were fired, “my heart goes out to the ladies that 
were told by letter they were no longer needed… It’s sad”).  
35
 Id. at *4 (quoting Shockency v. Ramsey Cnty, 493 F.3d 941, 949 (8th Cir. 2007).  
 8 
to the agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal.”36 The 
Court went further and stated that “[w]e cannot believe that every employee in [the law 
enforcement] office, whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, on 
pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being interpreted by the Constable as an 
individual that the employee may be unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.”37 
McPherson explains that it is not only the actual place of work that is taken into account when 
examining the employer’s interest for the purposes of Pickering, but the type of work the 
employee at issue performs.  A teacher, therefore, may be restricted from what he or she says 
online, more so than another employer, like the office clerk in McPherson.  This does however, 
create some discrepancies as to how to apply the balancing test concerning social networking 
sites.
38
  
2. The Public and Private Employment Distinction 
 The First Amendment protects individuals from government infringements.
39
 Generally 
speaking the First Amendment does not protect against private employers adverse employment 
actions taken against employees for things said on social media sites. 
In the private sphere, employees do not enjoy the same First Amendment protections that 
many public employees enjoy. 
40
 However, the NLRB similarly protects employees who speak 
                                                 
36
483 U.S., 378, 390-91 (1987) 
37
 Id. at 391. 
38
See  Patricia M. Nidiffer. Tinkering with Restrictions on Educator Speech: Can School Boards 
Restrict What Educators Say on Social Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 129 
(2010)  
39
 U.S. CONST. amend I; See Lloyd Corp., v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). 
 
 9 
out on Facebook about their work, but uses different reasoning than courts use for public 
employees.
41
 
B. The National Labor Relations Act and Employee Speech  
 While private employees may not have the same First Amendment protections against 
adverse employment actions as public employees, private employees may use the National Labor 
Relations Act as a means to protect what they say off hours on social media sites.
42
  Public 
employees cannot use the NLRA against their public employers because Section 2(2) excludes 
“any wholly owned Government Corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State of 
Political subdivision thereof” from the protections of the act.43 Section 7 of the NLRA lists the 
rights that are guaranteed to employees while section 8(a)(1) declares that employer interferences 
with employee Section 7 rights is an unfair labor practice. Included in an employees Section 7 
rights is the right “to engage[] in … concerted activities for the collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”44 The term “concerted activity” has never been explicitly defined by 
congress, and there has been a variety of activity that has been determined to be protected by the 
NLRB and the Supreme Court under this term, opening up debate over what the phrase truly 
covers.
45
  
                                                 
41
 William C. Martucci, Hiring and Firing in the Facebook Age (with Sample Provisions), Prac. 
Law October 2010, at 19, 25 (“Public employers must also be cognizant of First Amendment 
limitations on their ability to discipline employees who speak out on matters of public conern. 
For private employers, free speech normally is not an issue since the First Amendment only 
applies to state action and not to private conduct.”)  
42
 See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges 
Sept. 28, 2011).  
43
 National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (2012)  
44
 National Labor Relations Act §7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); National Labor Relations Act § 8, 
29 U.S.C.. 160 (2012) 
45
 See Robert Sprague. Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and 
Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957, 959 (2012) (“The term “concerted activities” is 
not defined by the NLRA and has been the subject of challenging interpretations and debate.”) 
 10 
After the advent of Facebook and the growth of policies issued by employers restricting 
employees’ activities on social media sites, the NLRB has received hundreds of charges by 
employees concerning adverse employment actions taken for updates on Facebook, and 
employee complaints over their employer handbooks restricting the speech of employees on 
social media sites.
46
 This suggests that the area surrounding private employment, social 
networking sites, and employee activity is still unclear with regards to what an employer can and 
cannot restrict.
47
  
Some of the debate over what employees post online and whether an employer can take 
adverse action against employees surrounds their employer’s social media policy handbook.48 
The General Counsel for the NLRB has found that in cases addressing social medial policies, an 
employer can violate section 8(a)(1) of the act if their policy is found to be too broad.
49
 The 
General Counsel articulates that “[a]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through the 
maintenance of a work rule if that rule would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise 
of their Section 7 rights.”50 To determine whether a policy or rule will chill an employee’s 
Section 7 rights, the Board takes a two-prong approach.
51
  First the Board determines if the 
policy “explicitly restricts Section 7 activity.” Then, if the rule does not restrict Section 7 activity 
explicitly, the policy “will violate the Act only upon a showing of one of the following: (1) 
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule 
                                                 
46
See Id. at 957.  
47
 See Id. (Employee’s charges over social media activity “raise concerns over the enforcement 
of overly broad social media policies by employers.”)  
48
 See Id. at 966. 
49
 Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Karen Fernback, Acting 
Regional Director of Region 2, Thomas Reuters, No. 02-CA-39682, 2011 WL 6960026, at *5 
(Apr. 5, 2011).   
50
 Id. at 14. 
51
 Id.  
 11 
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the 
exercise of Section 7 rights.”52 The General Counsel has held that policies can still be legal while 
the Guidelines associated with the policies can violate Section 7 rights under the two-prong 
analysis.   
The General Counsel stated that using broad terms like prohibiting “against embarrassing 
or disparaging the employer” or restricting comments “that would damage the reputation of the 
Employer,” either in the policy portion of the handbook or in the guideline portion of the 
handbook, would violate Section 7 rights under the second prong of the two prong approach.
53
   
In approaching a handbook case, the Office of the General Counsel struck down 
provisions of an employee hand book that prohibited employees “from using any social media… 
that ‘may in any way violate, compromise, or disregard … the rights and reasonable expectations 
as to privacy or confidentiality of any person or entity.’”54 In Flagler Hospital, the Office of the 
General Counsel also stuck down two more provisions of an employer social media handbook, 
that first restricted “‘[a]ny communication or post which constitutes embarrassment, harassment 
or defamation of the Hospital’ or of ‘any employee, officer, board member, representative or 
staff member,’” and second restricted “‘statements which lack … truthfulness or which might 
cause damage to or does damage the reputation or goodwill of the Hospital.’”55 Here the General 
Counsel struck down all three provisions as being over broad, however, the General Counsel 
gave no guidance as to what an appropriate employee handbook should be.  In the context of 
employee handbooks, cases like Flagler Hospital provide little guidance to employers who want 
                                                 
52
 Id.  
53
 Id. at 15. 
54
 Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Rochelle Kentov, Acting 
Regional Director of Region 12, Flagler Hospital, No. 12-CA-27031, 2011 WL 5115074, at *2-3 
(May 10, 2011).  
55
 Id.  
 12 
to create a comprehensive social media policy for their employees. Even though the cases 
provide some help in determining what employers should not say, there is little advice on what 
employers can say.  
While the cases addressing employer social media policies do not help employers 
completely in their ability to restrict their employees’ actions on Facebook, there has been some 
guidance provided by the General Counsel in other contexts. The three cases discussed below do 
not address the NLRA through an employee handbook analysis, but rather outline how the Board 
analyzes Facebook posting in the absence of any employee policy or in the presence of an 
unlawful or ambiguous policy.   
 The Supreme Court has held that an employee can still engage in concerted activity even 
if the employee is acting alone.
56
 Also, the NLRB as well as multiple courts have held that 
various amount of activities can be interpreted as “concerted activities” that are protected under 
NLRA.
57
  Such broad interpretations have laid the groundwork for the NLRB to conclude that 
social media output can, in certain circumstances, be protected under the NLRA even if there is 
no social media policy handbook in place restricting the comments of the employees.
58
  
In Knauz Motors, an employee posted various pictures of events taken at his work place 
and then posted comments about the pictures on his Facebook profile.
59
  In the Board’s ultimate 
holding, one set of comments made by the employee was protected under the NLRA while 
another set was held to be unprotected.  One set of pictures and comments related to a 
                                                 
56
 See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984)  
57
 See i.e. Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); see i.e., Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 NLRB 
244, 249 (1997).  
58
 See Knauz Motors, 13-CA-4652, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Sept. 28, 2011). 
59
 Id.  
 13 
promotional event his workplace held while another was of an accident that took place at work.
60
 
The promotional event served food that was dissatisfying to the employee, who stated below a 
picture of the event, “The small 8 oz bags of chips, and the $2.00 cookie plate from Sam’s Club, 
and the semi fresh apples and oranges were such a nice touch … but to top it all off… the Hot 
Dog Cart. Where our clients could attain a over cooked wiener and a stale bun.” There were 
multiple other comments made by the employee and others over the series of pictures that the 
employee posted online.  The second set of posting at issue in the Knauz Motors case dealt with 
an accident at work, in which a teenager was allowed behind the wheel of a car and ran over a 
customer’s foot.  The employee stated, “[t]his is what happens when a sales person sitting in the 
front passenger seat … allows a 13 year old boy to get behind the wheel of a 6000 lb. truck … 
The kid drives over his father’s foot and into the pond in all about 4 seconds and destroys a 
$50,000 truck. OOPS!” Multiple comments were made by “friends” of the employee on 
Facebook in connection to this event, including other employees of the company.  
 The Board addressed both comments made by the employee by first determining whether 
the activity at issue was “concerted activity” for the purposes of the NLRA.61  The Board quoted 
a Ninth Circuit case to support the conclusion that Facebook comments could be concerted 
activity, stating “the ‘activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow 
employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much ‘concerted activity’ as is ordinary 
group activity.”62   
For the promotional event, the Board noted that it was important that the employee had 
previously complained about food being served at the first event at issue, stating, “[t]he lone act 
                                                 
60
 Id.  
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
 14 
of a single employee is concerted if it ‘stems from’ or ‘logically grew’ out of prior concerted 
activity.” 63 Furthermore, the Board also found that his complaints connected to his wage or 
benefits. The Board reasoned, “there may have been customers who were turned off by the food 
offerings at the event and either did not purchase a car because of it, or gave the salesperson a 
lower rating in the Customer Satisfaction Rating because of it.”64 
For the Facebook postings about the car accident, the Board outright rejected any 
argument that the posting was concerted activity related to wages or terms of employment. The 
posting, according to the Board, did not relate to any discussion the employee ever had with the 
employer or other employees.  The Board also did not find any connection to the terms and 
conditions of employment so as to deserve protection under the NLRA.
65
 
 It is also important to note that even if the Facebook activity is “concerted activity” for 
the purposes of Section 7 of the NLRA, an employee can still lose the protections of the Act if 
the comments “rose ‘to the level of disparagement necessary to deprive otherwise protected 
activities”.66 In Knauz Motors, the Board went into an analysis to determine whether the 
comments made about the promotional event were characterized in such a way as to lose the 
protections of the NLRA.  The Board acknowledged that the employee used a “mocking and 
sarcastic tone” but that such tone did not rise to the level as to “deprive the activity of the 
protection of the Act.”67  
 While, in theory, it may possible for an employee to lose the protections of the NLRA 
through necessary disparagement, in practice, the General Counsel has actually allowed the 
                                                 
63
 Id. (internal quotations omitted.)  
64
 Id.   
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. (quoting Allied Aviation Service Company of New Jersey, Inc., 248 NLRB 229, 231 (1980)).  
67
 Id.  
 15 
Facebook comments to go quite far.
68
 In the AMR Adv. Mem., the General Counsel stated that a 
Facebook conversation in which an employee called her supervisor a “dick” and a “scumbag” 
did not raise to the level of disparagement that would lose the protection of the act. Specifically, 
the AMR Adv. Mem. looked at four factors to determine when an employee, while engaging in 
protected activity “has by opprobrious conduct lost the protection of the Act: (1) the place of the 
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; 
and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor 
practice.”69 Here, despite the inappropriate language used by the employee, the Office of the 
General Counsel held that, “the name-calling was not accompanied by any verbal or physical 
threats, and the Board has found more egregious name-calling protected.” The Office also took 
into account the fact that the comments were made in an online forum, and multiple people, 
including former co-workers engaged in conversation through Facebook.
70
 
 In advising a Region as to how to decide another Facebook case more similar to Knauz 
Motors than to the AMR Adv. Mem., the Office of General Counsel for the NLRB issued an 
opinion that mirrored the Knauz Motor analysis.
71
 The General Counsel was asked to issue 
advice for the Region for a case in which an truck employee posted online, “[H]ow the hell are 
you suppose to call in to your company dispatch and tell them anything when no one is there and 
the phone were not forwarded…Well if Im [sic] or any other drive for our company is late it will 
                                                 
68
 See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jonathan B. 
Kreisberg, Regional Director of Region 34, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 
No. 34-CA-12576 at 9 (Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter AMR Adv. Mem.], available at http:// 
mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458055b9c4; see also Complaint and Notice of 
Hearing, Am. Med. Response of Conn., Inc., No. 34-CA-12576 (N.L.R.B.G.C. Oct. 27, 2010) 
69
 Id. at 9.  
70
 Id. at 9-10.  
71
 See Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Jane North, Acting 
Regional Director Region 11, Buel, No. 11-CA-22936, 2011 WL 3793671 (N.L.R.B.G.C. July 
28, 2011).  
 16 
be your fault for not properly forwarding the phones on the call dispatch!”72 Despite the direct 
reference to a problem and issue with his work, the General Counsel advised that no concerted 
activity had occurred because the employee “did not discuss his Facebook posts with any of his 
fellow employees and none of his coworkers responded to his complaints about work-related 
matters… [and that] there is insufficient evidence that his Facebook activity was a continuation 
of any collective concerns.” The General Counsel also found that the comment was more of an 
expression of “his own frustration and boredom while stranded by the weather.”73 The General 
Counsel reasoned that protected activity “includes ‘circumstances in which the employees seek 
to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action’ and where individual employees bring 
‘truly group complaints’ to management’s attention.”74   
What can be concluded from these two cases is that the NLRB has created a very fact-
sensitive analysis for determining whether a social media update during off hours is a protected 
activity under the NLRA.  Despite the fact that in both cases the employees were discussing 
issues they had with work, the Board and the General Counsel seem to find the actions of the 
employees before they posted any comments online, and the connection to terms and conditions 
of employment, to be the main determining factors in deciding the protected status of a comment. 
Also relevant, was whether any other employee participated in the Facebook comments. Neither 
case however, outlines or acknowledges the interests of the employer within the context of the 
First Amendment.  
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Another issue not addressed by the two cases discussed above but also relevant to 
employee Facebook postings, is the issue of unlawful surveillance.
75
 In the MONOC advisory 
opinion, the Regional Director addressed a nurse’s Facebook posting that, according to the 
employer, were potential threats to withholding patient care.
76
 The employer became aware of 
the Facebook postings by the nurse employee when another employee contacted upper 
management about the online communications.
77
  The only individuals that were authorized to 
see the nurse employee’s Facebook postings were authorized “friends,” which included some co-
employees.
78
  The nurse employee alleged that the employer obtained the Facebook post through 
employer monitoring of the employees actions, which would be a violation of Section 7 rights, or 
rather, the right for employees to “feel free to participate in union activity ‘without the fear that 
members of management are peering over their shoulders[.]’”79  The Regional Director stated 
that such a violation occurs when “[a]n employer creates an impression of surveillance when ‘the 
employee would reasonable assume from the [employer’s] statement that their [sic] union 
activities had been placed under surveillance.”80 
In the MONOC advisory opinion, the Regional Director announced that when an 
employer finds or obtained Facebook postings through the voluntary actions of another employee, 
                                                 
75
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the findings would not constitute the impression of surveillance that would rise to a violation of 
Section 7 rights.
81
  
While the MONOC case did not find employer surveillance, the rule articulated by the 
Regional Director did not address a scenario in which the employer forces an employee to 
provide them with their Facebook passwords, or access to their Facebook pages.  The MONOC 
advisory opinion seems to suggest that such force, especially if the employer’s Facebook page 
was extremely limited to a small audience, would constitute a violation of Section 7 activity as 
unlawful surveillance.
82
 
 
C. The Differences and Similarities Between the Private and Public Employment: Who 
Protects Speech Better?  
 Private and public employees are both protected in what they say about their work on 
their social media sites in different ways. The protection that each employee has is limited 
dependent upon what laws applies to his or her employer. Analyzing a public employee’s 
conduct on social media sites is different and similar than analyzing a private employee’s 
conduct in five ways: 1. the public employee must take into account the public interest in his or 
her statement, while the private employer must be wary to take action against their employees 
interest in the terms and conditions of employment; 2. the public employee does not have to 
examine how many people commented or participated in the discussion online for protection, 
while the private employee should take into account whether other employees will respond to the 
message; 3. both the courts and the Board draw distinctions between “frustrations” and true 
                                                 
81
 Id. (“Here the employer did not actually engage in surveillance; instead it obtained [the nurse 
employee] Facebook pages and e-mails from other employees without soliciting them.”)  
82
 See id.  
 19 
complaints by looking at the entirety of the statement at issue; 4. the potential surveillance issue 
for both public and private employees; and 5. the courts balance the interest of the public 
employer against the employees interest, whereas the Board does not take into account the 
employer’s interest.  
1. The Public Interest vs. The Employees Labor Interests 
When analyzing free speech claims against employers by employees, the Supreme Court 
remains cognizant of the public’s interest in public employee’s speech.83 In City of San Diego, 
the Court articulated that “[u]nderlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that public 
employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as 
to the operations of their public employers, operations that are of substantial concern to the 
public.”84 The Court also states that “[t]he interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in 
receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.”  Additionally, in 
McPherson, the Supreme Court looks towards the overarching principals of free speech, stating 
that “[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and… may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”85 
 In the context of private employment, the Board does not look towards the public’s 
interest in the free speech of private employees. Neither case addressing Facebook postings 
without a social medial policy articulated a standard based on any interest of the public.  
However, Knauz Motors addressed how difficult it would be to strip the protection of the 
NLRA from actions deemed to be concerted for the purposes of the employees’ mutual aid or 
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protection.
86
 The underlying rational in the Knauz case was not whether the public had an 
interest in what the employee was saying, but rather, whether the statement made sought “to 
initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action” for the purposes of the employees’ mutual aid 
and protection, like wages or other benefits.
87
 The private employer, must remain wary of 
comments made by their employees that affect all employees rights to engage in group activity, 
where as the public employer should be cognizant as to whether an employee is speaking out 
about an issue of public concern.  However the standard for determining whether a public 
employee is speaking as to a matter of public concern is anything but clear.
88
 
2. The Number of Participants 
 How many comments one may get on a Facebook status or photo may make or break the 
determination as to whether a comment will be protected under the NLRA.
89
  In the Buel 
Advisory Opinion issued by the General Counsel of the NLRB, an employee’s Facebook 
comment was not protected because “none of [the employee posting on Facebook’s] coworkers 
responded to his complaints about work related matters. Although he had discussed the fact that 
the on-call dispatcher was not reachable with other drivers, there is insufficient evidence that his 
Facebook activity was a continuation of any collective concerns.”90 While other evidence may 
have supported the conclusion that the activity was a “continuation of any collective concern,” 
other employees commenting on a status could have supported a finding of a Section 8(a)(1) 
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violation by the charging party. While in Knauz Motors, the NLRB did not hold that the 
comments on the Facebook page of the employee were dispositive, the employee at issue in that 
case was friends with other coworkers and had even posted pictures of them at the events at issue 
online.
91
 
 While the O’Brien court did acknowledge how many Facebook friends the public 
employee had at issue, it was not related to whether the speech was of the type that could be 
protected under the First Amendment, but rather, whether the speech adversely affected the 
employer.
92
 In O’Brien, her potential issue was the opposite of the problem in the opinion issued 
by the General Counsel for the NLRB. Her Facebook posts caused too much disruption, and was 
a factor the court considered in supporting the school’s decision to fire her.93  
 Generally speaking, private employees, if they want to gain protection under the NLRA 
for what they say on Facebook, should take into consideration the number of co-workers 
participating in the online conversation where as public employees should be wary of how many 
people, or “customers,” may have access to their statements.  
3. The Context of the Statement 
 Both the NLRB and courts look towards the context of the statements at issue to 
determine whether an employee is truly expressing a grievance or whether they are just taking 
out their frustrations on Facebook.  In the Buel Advisory Opinion issued by the General Counsel 
of the NLRB, the Counsel reasoned that protection should not be extended to the employee at 
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issue because he “plainly was not seeking to induce or prepare for group action. Instead, he was 
simply expressing his own frustration and boredom while stranded by the weather, by griping 
about his inability to reach the on-call dispatcher.”94 Similarly, a review of the NLRB cases that 
have address charges similar to the one addressed by the General Counsel revolve around 
statements of employees “griping about work and getting fired for it.”95 
 In the public employment context, workers must also worry about whether their 
statements can be taken as actual “matters of public concern,” or just complaints about their 
work.  In O’Brien the court found that the comments the public employee made were not matters 
of public concern so as to qualify for the protections of the First Amendment.
96
 There the court 
found that the employee “took a legitimate issue of public concern and distorted [it] into a 
vehicle to let her more than 300 Facebook ‘friends’ know she was having a bad time at work.”97  
 Both the NLRB and the O’Brien court looked towards the context of the statement by 
examining the surrounding circumstances the employee was in when they wrote the comments to 
determine whether they were venting frustration, or if they were truly engaging in protected 
activity.  In O’Brien the court examined the teacher’s testimony and found that she could not 
establish that “she ardently wanted the public to know more about the correlation between 
classroom behavior and academic performance.”98  Without such testimony, the court did not 
conclude that the statements made online crossed the threshold of only speaking upon matters of 
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personal interest, into matters of public concern.
99
 In the Buel Advisory Opinion issued by the 
General Counsel, the court looked at what the employee was doing at the time he wrote the 
Facebook status, and held that the employee was ultimately just frustrated about being out in the 
cold, and therefore did not cross the threshold into “concerted” activity.100 If instead, the 
employee attempted to use his own particular situation as a way to engage other co-workers into 
convincing the employer to keep the employees out of the cold, then the General Counsel may 
have found differently.  
4. Surveillance 
 None of the cases addressing the First Amendment and public employment took issue 
with the potential surveillance issues that can come up after an employer takes adverse actions 
against an employees’ Facebook posting. However, in the private sector, employers should stay 
conscious of the way they obtain their employees’ Facebook postings so as to be aware of the 
potential violation of Section 7 rights. While the NLRB has yet to address a case that is different 
than a supervisor obtaining a Facebook comment through another co-worker or through their 
own access to an employee’s Facebook page, it is possible that the Board may find surveillance 
to exist if other means are used to obtain an employee’s Facebook information.101  
 Another potential issue that surveillance brings up in the private employment context is 
whether the General Counsel’s advisory opinions addressing the issue have opened the door to 
chilling the labor rights of individuals. By finding that employers who have obtained Facebook 
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information of one employee through another employee is not surveillance of an employee’s 
Facebook, employees may be more inclined to restrict their postings to very few “friends” 
thereby potentially causing an indirect chilling effect of Section 7 activity.  While this is an issue 
addressed in law review articles and in arguments made by employees who have been disciplined 
by their employers, neither the NLRB or the General Counsel has yet to address this potential 
chilling effect. However, such a concern may be raised in the future for private employers.
102
 
5. The Employer’s Interest 
 In O’Brien, the court stated that the school environment was different because the 
employee at issue “is responsible for nurturing young children, and must work in concert with 
administrators, parents and the community at large to promote student success.”103 In other 
public employment contexts, the court does not provide the same amount of deference to 
employers when they fire employees.
104
 In McPherson the Supreme Court stated that when “an 
employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contract role, the danger to the 
agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal.”105 McPherson 
supports the proposition that, at least in the public employment context, where you work matters.  
 The NLRB does not, at least in the cases addressed so far, take into account the 
employer’s interest in determining whether an employee’s speech is protected under the NLRA 
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unless the employer has a social media policy and the employer is in the journalism industry.
106
 
Neither case that addressed social media comments where the employer did not articulate a 
standard looked towards the employer’s interest in any way, and instead focused on the context 
of the statement and the participants of the postings. 
 
III. Conclusion  
 
 Both the private and public employment law surrounding the social media activities of 
employees has its pros and cons from an employees’ perspective. Both legal analyses do not give 
clear guidance as to what employers should say in restricting employee conduct, and neither give 
any bright line rules regarding employee actions.  Equally murky are the definitions of “public 
concern” and “mutual aid and protection” that do not provide much guidance as to what types of 
statements are actually protected under the applicable laws and constitutional provisions. For 
public employees, where they work makes a large difference in the restrictions placed upon them. 
For private employees, the interactions that they have with their coworkers about the terms and 
conditions of their employment matter as to whether or not a statement about work can be 
protected. So, for Facebook-active employees deciding whether the public or private 
employment sphere would protect them against adverse employment actions, there is no clear 
winner in who protects the interest of employees better, the First Amendment or the NLRA.  
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